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ABSTRACT
Aggregating preferences over combinatorial domains has several
applications in artificial intelligence. Due to the exponential na-
ture of combinatorial preferences, compact representations are
needed, and (m)CP-nets are among the most studied formalisms.
Unlike CP-nets, which received an extensive complexity analy-
sis,mCP-nets, as mentioned several times in the literature, lacked
such a thorough characterization. An initial complexity analysis for
mCP-nets was carried out only recently. In this paper, we further
investigate the complexity of mCP-nets. In particular, we prove
the ΣP3 -completeness of checking the existence of max optimal out-
comes, which was left as an open problem. We furthermore prove
that various tasks known to be feasible in polynomial time are
actually P-complete. This shows that these problems are inherently
sequential, and hence they cannot benefit from highly parallel com-
putation. The P-completeness results here proven are among the
very first of this kind in the computational social choice literature.
KEYWORDS
CP-nets; mCP-nets; combinatorial preferences; preference aggrega-
tion; complexity; rank voting; max voting; P-completeness.
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of managing and aggregating agent preferences has at-
tracted extensive interest in the computer science community [10],
because methods for representing and reasoning about prefer-
ences are significant in AI applications, such as recommender
systems [42], (group) product configuration [7, 16, 48], (group)
planning [6, 44, 45, 47], (group) preference-based constraint sat-
isfaction [2, 4, 8], and (group) preference-based query answer-
ing/information retrieval [15, 35, 36], just to name a few. In com-
puter science, the study of preference aggregation has often been
based on social choice theory [10]. In this theory, it is common to as-
sume that agents’ preferences are explicitly represented. Although
this is reasonable when small sets of candidates are considered, this
is not feasible when the voting domain is combinatorial, i.e., the set
of candidates, or outcomes, is the Cartesian product of finite value
domains for each of a set of features [25, 28].
Combinatorial domains contain an exponential number of out-
comes in the number of features, and hence compact representa-
tions for combinatorial preferences are needed [25, 28]. CP-nets [3],
which are a graph model, are among the most studied of these repre-
sentations, as proven by a vast literature on them. In CP-nets, graph
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vertices represent features, and an edge from vertex A to vertex B
models the influence of the value of feature A on the choice of the
value of feature B. Intuitively, this model captures preferences like
“if the rest of the dinner is the same, with a fish dish (A’s value),
I prefer a white wine (B’s value)”.
CP-nets were used to model preferences of groups, obtaining the
mCP-nets [43]. This multi-agent model is a set of CP-nets, one for
each agent. The preference semantics ofmCP-nets is defined via
voting schemes: Through their own individual CP-nets, each agent
votes whether an outcome is preferred to another. Various voting
schemes were proposed formCP-nets [32, 43] and different voting
schemes give rise to different dominance semantics formCP-nets.
In the voting schemes proposed formCP-nets, the voting protocol
adopted, i.e., the actual way in which votes are collected [13], is
global voting [26] over the CP-nets of the single players. In this pro-
tocol, the outcomes of the vote are computed by having in input the
whole CP-nets (see Section 7 for related works on different voting
protocols over CP-nets). In the literature, a comparison between
global voting and other protocols over CP-nets was explicitly asked
for and stated to be highly promising [26]. However, global voting
over CP-nets has not been thoroughly investigated as other proto-
cols (see Section 7). In fact, unlike CP-nets, which were extensively
analyzed, a precise complexity analysis ofmCP-nets was missing
for long time, as explicitly mentioned several times in the litera-
ture [26, 29–32]. An initial complexity analysis of voting tasks over
mCP-nets was carried out only recently [33]. For example, deciding
Pareto dominance was shown co-NP-complete, and deciding the
existence of weak Condorcet winners was proven ΣP2 -complete. The
aim of this paper is to further explore the complexity ofmCP-nets
(and hence the complexity of global voting over CP-nets).
Contributions. In this paper, we focus on acyclic binary polynomi-
ally connectedmCP-nets with standard CP-nets, i.e., the constituent
CP-nets of anmCP-net rank all the features, and they are not par-
tial CP-nets. Therefore, in this paper the dominance semantics of
mCP-nets is precisely global voting over CP-nets. Our contributions
are briefly as follows:
◃ Via a non-trivial reduction, we show the ΣP3 -completeness
of deciding the existence of max optimal outcomes;
◃ We prove that various voting tasks overmCP-nets known
to be feasible in polynomial time are actually P-complete.
Furthermore, as a side result of our investigation:
◃ We define the P-complete Th-CVP problem of deciding,
given a Boolean circuit C , a Boolean vector x, and an in-
teger k , whether the number of logical gates of C evaluating
to true when x is given in input to C is at least k . This prob-
lem can be very useful in reductions showing P-hardness of
problems involving counting tasks.
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Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we provide an overview
of our results. Preliminaries on CP-nets andmCP-nets are given
in Section 3. We show P-completeness results over CP-nets and
mCP-nets in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we study
max voting. We close our paper with a discussion on related works
in Section 7, and we draw our conclusion in Section 8. For space
constraints, we only provide proof intuitions for various results.
Details will be provided in a forthcoming extended paper.
2 OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE
RESULTS
In Tables 1 and 2 there is a summary of our results. Definitions of the
concepts mentioned in this section are given in the preliminaries.
We prove that deciding the existence of max optimal outcomes
is ΣP3 -complete. This supports that, in mCP-nets, max voting is
computationally more demanding than majority voting, for which
deciding the existence of optimal outcomes is ΣP2 -complete [33].
The increase in the complexity is due to the need in max dominance
of precisely counting the number of agents preferring an outcome
to another, whereas this precision is not required in majority voting
(majority and max dominance are NP-complete and ΘP2 -complete,
respectively [33, 34]). This complexity dissimilarity is carried over
to the complexity of deciding the existence of optimal outcomes.
Besides this, we obtain several P-completeness results, which are
quite interesting. Let us consider a group planning scenario [6], in
whichmultiple autonomous agents have to agree upon a shared plan
of actions to reach a goal that is preferred by the group as a whole.
For example, a group of autonomous robots coordinating during the
exploration of a remote area/planet. Each robot has a specific task
to accomplish, and the group, as a whole, coordinates to achieve a
common goal. Robots have their own specific preferences over a
vast amount of variables/features emerging from the contingency
of the situation to complete their individual tasks. However, their
individual preferences have to be blended in all together, so that
the course of action of an agent does not interfere with the tasks of
the other agents and the mission is successful.
Managing huge amount of data could be tackled by using parallel
algorithms. However, there are problems that, although solvable in
polynomial time, are inherently sequential and hence do not benefit
from highly parallel processing [21]. By saying that a problem L
does not benefit from parallel processing, it is not meant that L does
not admit parallel algorithms for its solution, but it means that par-
allel algorithms for Lwould not provide a speedup comparable with
the increase in the amount of processing hardware available [21].
Decision problems of this type are the P-hard ones, which are often
said to be non-parallelizable [21]. For this reason, P-complete prob-
lems are quite interesting, because they are in P, and hence they
are regarded as “easy”, but they are not parallelizable, which could
be an issue when the input is of remarkable size.
P-time voting has attracted extensive consideration. However,
to the best of our knowledge, P-hardness has not been carefully
investigated so far in the computational social choice literature
(see Section 7). In fact, it may well be the case that P-time voting
schemes are actually P-hard, which would be a sign that these
voting procedures would not scale up over huge input instances.
Here we show that this is the case for some voting tasks over
Table 1: Summary of the results for CP-nets.
Problem Complexity
Feat-Value-Opt P-complete
Same-Opt P-complete
Rank-Bound P-complete
Compare-Rank P-complete
Table 2: Summary of the results formCP-nets. *Membership
shown in [33].
Problem Complexity
Exists-Pareto-Optimum P-complete*
Rank-Dominance P-complete*
Is-Rank-Optimal P-complete*
Is-Rank-Optimum P-complete*
Exists-Rank-Optimum P-complete*
Exists-Max-Optimal ΣP3 -complete
*
Exists-Max-Optimum in ΣP3
mCP-nets. Hence, the P-completeness results reported here, not
only characterize more precisely the complexity ofmCP-nets, but
they also point out a significant issue, which is whether P-time
voting schemes can benefit from parallel algorithms or not.
Observe that we show P-completeness already for the evaluation
of the optimal outcome and the rank of outcomes on single CP-nets.
Therefore, the P-completeness of preference aggregation based on
these concepts derives from the P-hardness of the underlying con-
cepts on single CP-nets. This points out that, to have parallelizable
preference aggregation semantics, we need simpler semantics that
are parallelizable (e.g., in LogSpace) already on single CP-nets.
3 PRELIMINARIES
CP-nets. A CP-net N is formally defined as a triple ⟨GN ,DomN ,
(CPT FN )F ∈FN ⟩, where GN = ⟨FN , EN ⟩ is a directed graph whose
vertices FN represent the features of the combinatorial domain,
DomN is a function, and (CPT FN )F ∈FN is a family of functions. For
a feature F , DomN associates a (value) domain DomN (F ) with F ,
while CPT FN is the so called “CP table” of F .
The domain of a feature F is the set of values that F may have
in the outcomes. Here, we assume features to be binary, i.e., each
feature’s domain contains two values.We denote by f and f the two
values of F , called the overlined and the non-overlined value (of F ),
respectively. For a feature setS ⊆ FN ,DomN (S) = ×F ∈SDomN (F ).
An outcome is an element of the set ON = DomN (FN ). For a feature
F ∈ FN and an outcome α , α[F ] is F ’s value in α . For a feature set
S ⊆ FN and an outcome α , α[S] is the projection of α over S.
CP tables encode preferences over feature values. The CP table of
feature F has a row for any possible combination of values of all the
parent features of F in GN ; in each row there is a total order over
DomN (F ). This order encodes agent’s preferences for F ’s values
when specific values of F ’s parents are considered: f ≻ f denotes
f being preferred to f . If F has no parents, its CP table has only one
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row with a total order over DomN (F ). Note that indifferences be-
tween features values are not admitted in (classical) CP-nets. When
we will outline CP tables in figures, we will use a “logic notation” to
identify, for which values of the parents of the features, a particular
CP table row has to be considered. Although this is the notion
which generalized propositional CP-nets are based on [17], in this
paper it is used only for notational convenience. Here we always
assume that CP tables are extensively and explicitly represented in
the input instances. We denote by ∥N ∥ the size of CP-net N , i.e.,
the space in terms of bits required to represent the whole net N
(which includes, features, links, feature domains, and CP tables).
CP-nets’ preference semantics is based on “improving flips”. Let
F be a feature, and let α , β be two outcomes differing only on F ’s
value. Flipping F from α[F ] to β[F ] is an improving flip (of F in
N ) iff, in the row of F ’s CP table associated with the values in
α of the parents of F , β[F ] ≻ α[F ]. Outcome β is preferred to α ,
or β dominates α (in N ), denoted β ≻N α , iff there is a sequence
of improving flips from α to β , otherwise β does not dominate α ,
denoted β ̸≻N α ; β and α are incomparable, denoted β ◃▹N α , iff
β ̸≻N α and α ̸≻N β . Observe that, since there are no indifferences
between features values in (classical) CP-nets, for any two outcomes
α and β , either one dominates the other, or they are incomparable.
A CP-net N is binary iff all its features are binary; N is singly
connected iff, for any two features G and F of N , there is at most
one path from G to F in GN . A classF of CP-nets is polynomially
connected, iff there exists a polynomial p such that, for any CP-net
N ∈ F and for any two features G and F of N , there are at most
p(∥N ∥) distinct paths fromG to F inGN . A CP-netN is acyclic iffGN
is acyclic. Acyclic CP-nets N have a unique optimum outcome oN ,
dominating all others, that can be computed in polynomial time [3].
The rank of an outcome α in a CP-net N , RankN (α), is the length of
the shortest improving flipping sequence from α to oN [43]. Unless
stated otherwise, we consider acyclic binary CP-nets.
mCP-nets. AnmCP-net is a set ofm CP-nets defined over the same
set of features having, in turn, the same domain. The “m” of an
mCP-net is the agents’ number, so a 3CP-net is anmCP-net with
m = 3. Originally, partial CP-nets were allowed to be constituent
ofmCP-nets [43]. We assume only standard CP-nets to be part of
mCP-nets, and we do not assume CP-nets to be O-legal (i.e., we
de not assume that the CP-nets of an mCP-net have a common
topological order of the features).mCP-nets’ semantics is based on
voting. LetM = ⟨N1, . . . ,Nm⟩ be anmCP-net, and let α , β be two
outcomes.We define the sets S≻M (α , β) = {i | α ≻Ni β}, S≺M (α , β) ={i | α ≺Ni β}, and S◃▹M (α , β) = {i | α ◃▹Ni β}, as the sets of agents
preferring α to β , preferring β to α , and for which α and β are
incomparable, respectively. RankM (α)=
∑
1≤i≤m RankNi (α) [43].
The following are the dominance semantics considered:
Pareto: β Pareto dominates α , denoted by β ≻pM α , iff all the agents
ofM prefer β to α , i.e., |S≻M (β ,α)| =m.
Majority: β majority dominates α , denoted by β ≻majM α , iff the
majority of the agents ofM prefers β to α , i.e., |S≻M (β ,α)| >
|S≺M (β,α)| + |S◃▹M (β ,α)|.
Max: β max dominates α , denoted by β ≻maxM α , iff the group of the
agents ofM preferring β to α is the biggest, i.e., |S≻M (β ,α)| >
max(|S≺M (β ,α)|, |S◃▹M (β ,α)|).
Rank: β rank dominates α , denoted by β ≻rM α , iff RankM (β) <
RankM (α).
For a voting scheme s , α is s optimal inM iff β ̸≻sM α for all β , α ,
whereas α is s optimum inM iff α ≻sM β for all β , α . Optimum
outcomes, if they exist, are unique.
AnmCP-net is acyclic, binary, and singly connected, iff all its
CP-nets are acyclic, binary, and singly connected, respectively.
A class F of mCP-nets is polynomially connected, iff the set of
CP-nets of themCP-nets inF is polynomially connected. Unless
stated otherwise, the consideredmCP-nets are acyclic, binary, and
belong to polynomially connected classes ofmCP-nets.
Complexity Classes. We assume basic knowledge of computa-
tional complexity and of the polynomial hierarchy (PH); see [22, 40]
for an overview. A language L is P-hard iff, for all languages L′
in P, there is a log-space reduction from L′ to L. A language L is
P-complete iff L is in P and is P-hard.
4 P-COMPLETE PROBLEMS ON CP-NETS
In this section, we show the P-completeness of various tasks over
CP-nets. To prove these results, we will exploit the P-completeness
of the classical CVP problem defined below.
In the Circuit Value Problem (CVP) [24], for a Boolean circuit C
and a Boolean vector x, we have to decide whether C ’s output is
true when receiving x as input. In the literature, various ways to
represent circuits were illustrated. Here, we use a representation
that is a mix of those in [24, 39]. A circuit C = {C1, . . . ,Cm } is a
sequence of logic gates, which are represented through formulas:
(i) if Ci = x j , Ci is an input gate fed with the jth input bit; (ii) if
Ci = Cj ∧Ck (resp., Ci = Cj ∨Ck ), Ci is an AND (resp., OR) gate,
whose inputs are the outputs of Cj and Ck (with j,k < i); (iii) if
Ci = ¬Cj , Ci is a NOT gate, whose input is the output of Cj (with
j < i). The Boolean values of gates Ci when x is given in input to
C , denoted by vC (Ci , x), are defined in the natural way.
We assume that the problem CVP is defined as in [21]. A CVP
instance I = ⟨C , x,Cout⟩, where C = {C1, . . . ,Cm } is a circuit,
x = {x1, . . . ,xn } is a vector, and Cout ∈ C is the output gate, is a
‘yes’-instance iffvC (Cout , x) = true.CVP is known to be P-complete
and its hardness holds even if various restrictions are issued over the
circuit structure and even if the output is fixed to beCm [21, 24, 39].
For the following results, we need CP-nets mimicking the be-
havior of circuits when specific vectors are given in input. Let
C = {C1, . . . ,Cm } be a circuit and let x = {x1, . . . ,xn } be an input
vector. The CP-net N (C , x), defined from C and x, is as follows. For
each gateCi ∈ C , there is a feature Di ∈ FN (C ,x), and Di ’s domain
is {di ,di }. The intuition of the transformation is that values di and
di of Di are associated with gate Ci evaluating to true and false,
respectively, when x is given in input to C .
• If Ci is an input gate with Ci = x j , there is no edge entering
in Di ; if x j = true, di ≻ di ; if x j = false, di ≻ di .
• If Ci is an AND (resp., OR) gate, with Ci = Cj ∧ Ck (resp.,
Ci = Cj ∨Ck ), then there are two edges entering in Di , one
from D j and one from Dk . If Ci = Cj ∧Ck , for Di , di ≻ di
iff both D j and Dk have overlined values. If Ci = Cj ∨Ck ,
for Di , di ≻ di iff D j or Dk has an overlined value.
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• If Ci is a NOT gate with Ci = ¬Cj , there is an edge from D j
to Di ; for Di , di ≻ di if D j has value dj , di ≻ di otherwise.
Observe that N (C , x) is binary, acyclic, and can be computed
in logarithmic space from C and x (because the indegree of each
feature is at most 2, i.e., it is bounded by a constant, and hence
the number of rows in the CP tables of N (C , x) is bounded by a
constant). Therefore, all the hardness results shown here hold even
on acyclic binary (m)CP-nets with indegree 2. Via induction on the
gates’ levels in C , it can be shown that, in N (C , x), a feature Di
has value di in the optimum outcome iff vC (Ci , x) = true.
Lemma 4.1. Let C = {C1, . . . ,Cm } be a circuit, and let x be an
input vector. For any gate Ci , vC (Ci , x) = true iff oN (C ,x)[Di ] = di .
From this key property follows the P-hardness of the problem
Feat-Value-Opt: For a CP-net N , a feature F ∈ FN , and a value
v ∈ DomN (F ) for F , decide whether the value of F in the optimum
outcome of N is v , i.e., oN [F ] = v .
Theorem 4.2. Feat-Value-Opt is P-complete.
Consider now the problem Same-Opt: Given two (different)
CP-nets N1 and N2 defined over the same set of features, which,
in turn, have the same domain in the two nets, decide whether
the optimum outcome of N1 equals the optimum outcome of N2,
i.e., oN1 = oN2 . We can show that Same-Opt is P-complete. The
intuition behind the P-hardness proof (a reduction from CVP) is to
encode the same circuit in N1 and N2 with an additional feature
O . In N1, O is attached to the output gate and replicates its value,
instead, in N2, O has a specific preferred value, say o. In this case,
oN1 = oN2 iff the circuit outputs true.
Theorem 4.3. Same-Opt is P-complete.
Let us denote by TG(C , x) the number of C ’s gates Ci such that
vC (Ci , x) = true. Consider this new problem Th-CVP (Threshold
CVP): Given a Boolean circuit C , an input vector x, and an integer
k , decide whetherTG(C , x) ≤ k . The P-hardness can be shown via
a reduction from CVP. The idea behind the proof is to modify the
original circuit by attaching to the original output gate a cascade
of (enough) gates replicating the output’s value. Then, when the
output is true, a number of gates greater than k evaluates to true.
Theorem 4.4. Th-CVP is P-complete. Hardness holds even if the
threshold number k is such that k < ⌊|C |/2⌋.
Proof. Th-CVP is in P, because gates’ values can be evaluated
in polynomial time [21, 24], and then we can count those evaluating
to true and compare the count with k (in polynomial time).
Hardness can be shown via a reduction from CVP. Consider
the following reduction transforming an instance ⟨C , x,Cout⟩ of
CVP, where C = {C1, . . . ,Cm }, into an instance ⟨C ′, x′,k⟩ of Th-
CVP. C ′ consists of 2m gates, whose first m gates are identical
(for function and wiring) to those of C . The remainingm gates of
C ′ essentially replicate the value of C ′out = Cout . More formally,
C ′m+1 = C
′
out ∧ C ′out , and, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ m, C ′m+i = C ′m+i−1 ∧
C ′m+i−1. The input vector x
′ equals x, and k = m − 1. Clearly,
the reduction can be computed in logarithmic space. Observe that
k =m−1 < ⌊2m/2⌋, where 2m = |C ′ |. Given that P is closed under
complement, in this case we assume that ‘yes’-instances of CVP
are those in which the output of the circuit is false.
(⇒) If ⟨C , x⟩ is a ‘yes’-instance of CVP, i.e., vC (Cout , x) = false,
then vC ′(C ′out , x′) = vC ′(C ′m+1, x′) = · · · = vC ′(C ′2m , x′) = false.
Hence,TG(C′, x′) ≤ |C ′ |−(m+1) =m−1 = k , and thus ⟨C ′, x′,k⟩
is a ‘yes’-instance of Th-CVP as well.
(⇐) On the other hand, if ⟨C , x⟩ is a ‘no’-instance of CVP, i.e.,
vC (Cout , x) = true, then vC ′(C ′out , x′) = vC ′(C ′m+1, x′) = · · · =
vC ′(C ′2m , x′) = true. Hence, TG(C′, x′) ≥ m + 1 > m − 1 = k , and
thus ⟨C ′, x′,k⟩ is a ‘no’-instance of Th-CVP as well. 
Problem Rank-Bound is, for a CP-net N , an outcome α ∈ ON ,
and an integerk , decidewhether RankN (α) ≤ k . For acyclic CP-nets,
RankN (α) = |{F | F ∈ FN ∧ α[F ] , oN [F ]}|, (1)
i.e., α ’s rank in N is the number of features whose value in α differs
from its value in oN [33]. Rank-Bound’s P-hardness follows from
Lemma 4.1 and Equation (1), by which the number of overlined
values in the optimum outcome of N (C , x) equals TG(C , x).
Theorem 4.5. Rank-Bound is P-complete.
Problem Compare-Rank is, for a CP-net N and two outcomes
α , β ∈ ON , decide whether RankN (β) < RankN (α). Its P-hardness
can be shown from Feat-Value-Opt. In fact, by Equation (1), for a
CP-net N , two outcomes α and β differing only on the value of a
feature F are such that RankN (β) < RankN (α) iff β[F ] is oN [F ].
Theorem 4.6. Compare-Rank is P-complete.
Proof. Membership in P follows from the fact that computing
outcome ranks in acyclic CP-nets is feasible in polynomial time [33],
and then we can compare them (in polynomial time).
Hardness can be shown via a reduction from Feat-Value-Opt.
Consider the reduction transforming an instance ⟨N , F ,v⟩ of Feat-
Value-Opt into the instance ⟨N ′,α , β⟩ of Compare-Rank as fol-
lows (assume w.l.o.g. thatv = f ): N ′ = N , α and β are the outcomes
assigning non-overlined values to all features but F , and α[F ] = f ,
while β[F ] = f . By Equation (1), and since α and β differ only on the
value assigned to feature F , there is a difference of exactly 1 between
the rank of the two outcomes, i.e., |RankN ′(β) − RankN ′(α)| = 1.
(⇒) If ⟨N , F ,v⟩ is a ‘yes’-instance of Feat-Value-Opt, oN [F ] =
f = v . Hence, RankN ′(β) < RankN ′(α).
(⇐) If ⟨N , F ,v⟩ is a ‘no’-instance of Feat-Value-Opt, oN [F ] =
f , v . Hence, RankN ′(α) < RankN ′(β). 
5 P-COMPLETE PROBLEMS ONmCP-NETS
First, we focus on a Pareto voting task. Consider the problem Exists-
Pareto-Optimum: Given anmCP-netM, decide whetherM has
a Pareto optimum outcome. AcyclicmCP-nets have a Pareto opti-
mum outcome iff all their individual CP-nets have the very same
individual optimum outcome [33]. By this, the P-hardness of Exists-
Pareto-Optimum follows from the P-hardness of Same-Opt.
Theorem 5.1. Exists-Pareto-Optimum is P-hard. Hardness holds
even on 2CP-nets.
Since Exists-Pareto-Optimum is also in P [33], it is P-complete.
In the rest of the section we prove the hardness results for rank
voting overmCP-nets. Consider the problem Rank-Dominance:
Given anmCP-netM and two outcomesα , β ∈ OM , decidewhether
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β ≻rM α , i.e., decide whether RankM (β) < RankM (α). We re-
mind to the reader that, for an mCP-net M = ⟨N1, . . . ,Nm⟩,
RankM (α) =
∑
1≤i≤m RankNi (α). Hence,Rank-Dominance’s hard-
ness follows from the P-hardness of Compare-Rank on CP-nets.
Theorem 5.2. Rank-Dominance is P-hard. Hardness holds even
on 1CP-nets.
Since Rank-Dominance is also in P [33], it is P-complete.
Consider now problems Is-Rank-Optimal and Is-Rank-Opti-
mum: Given an mCP-net M and an outcome α ∈ OM , decide
whether α is rank optimal (resp., optimum) inM. We recall some
definitions from [33]. A value v of a feature F is average optimal iff
v is in argminv ∈DomM (F ) |{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m ∧ v , oNi [F ]}|, i.e., iff v
minimizes the number of agents i for which v is different from the
value of F in the optimum outcome of agent i’s CP-net. An outcome
α is average optimal iff, for each feature F , α[F ] is average optimal.
An outcome is rank optimal iff it is average optimal [33]. Since
mCP-nets have always average optimal outcomes,mCP-nets have
always rank optimal outcomes.1 Computing average optimal out-
comes ofmCP-nets is feasible in polynomial time (we just need to
compute the individual optimal outcomes to perform the counting
operations). Observe that, if anmCP-netM has two average opti-
mal outcomes, thenM has two rank optimal outcomes, and hence
M has no rank optimum outcome, because different rank optimal
outcomes do not rank dominate each other (which is required to
be rank optimum). Thus, binarymCP-nets with an odd number of
CP-nets, since they have a unique average optimal outcome, have
only one rank optimal outcome which is also rank optimum.
In the reductions for Is-Rank-Optimal and Is-Rank-Optimum,
we will use a CP-net that is designed to have a desired optimum
outcome. Let S be a set of binary features, and let α ∈ Dom(S) be
an outcome. The “direct” net D(α) has as features the set S and has
no edge. The CP table of feature F is f ≻ f , if α[F ] = f ; on the
other hand the CP table of feature F is f ≻ f , if α[F ] = f .
Thanks to direct nets, P-hardness of Is-Rank-Optimal and Is-
Rank-Optimum can be shown from Feat-Value-Opt. In fact, in
anmCP-net ⟨N ,N ′,N ′′⟩, where N ′ and N ′′ are designed to have
optimum outcomes differing only on the value of a feature F , oN ′
is average optimal iff oN [F ] is a specific value.
Theorem 5.3. Is-Rank-Optimal and Is-Rank-Optimum are P-hard.
Hardness holds even on 3CP-nets.
Proof. Hardness can be shown via a reduction from Feat-Value-
Opt. Consider the reduction transforming an instance ⟨N , F ,v⟩ of
Feat-Value-Opt into the instance ⟨M,α⟩ of Is-Rank-Optimal
(resp., Is-Rank-Optimum) as follows (assume w.l.o.g. that v = f ):
M = ⟨N1,N2,N3⟩ is a 3CP-net, where N1 = N , N2 = D(α), with
α being an outcome defined over the features in N and assigning
non-overlined values to all features, and N3 = D(β), with β being
almost equal to α , except for β[F ] = f .
Observe that the value α[G] is the average optimal value for all
features G , F , because, for all features G , F , α[G] = β[G]. Since
α[F ] = f and β[F ] = f , α is rank optimal inM iff oN [F ] = f = v .
To conclude, sinceM contains an odd number of CP-nets, α is rank
optimum inM iff α is rank optimal inM (see above). 
1A different proof ofmCP-nets always having rank optimal outcomes is in [43].
Is-Rank-Optimal and Is-Rank-Optimum are in P [33], hence
they are P-complete.
The P-hardness of Exists-Rank-Optimum can be shown from
Feat-Value-Opt via direct nets, as well. In an mCP-net ⟨N ,N ,
N ′,N ′′⟩, where N ′ and N ′′ have optimum outcomes being equal
only on the value of a feature F , oN is the unique average optimal
outcome (and so, rank optimum) iff oN [F ] is a specific value.
Theorem 5.4. Exists-Rank-Optimum is P-hard. Hardness holds
even on 4CP-nets.
Proof. Hardness can be shown via a reduction from Feat-Value-
Opt. Consider the reduction transforming an instance ⟨N , F ,v⟩ of
Feat-Value-Opt into the instance ⟨M⟩ of Exists-Rank-Optimum
as follows (assume w.l.o.g. that v = f ):M = ⟨N1,N2,N3,N4⟩ is a
4CP-net, where N1 = N2 = N , N3 = D(α), with α being an outcome
defined over the features in N and assigning non-overlined values
to all features, and N4 = D(β), with β assigning overlined values to
all features but F for which β[F ] = f .
M has a rank optimum outcome iff M has a unique average
optimal outcome (see above). For any featureG , F , since N1[G] =
N2[G], N3[G] = д, and N4[G] = д, the average optimal value is
unique and it is oN [G]. Therefore,M has a unique average optimal
outcome iff the average optimal value for feature F is unique inM.
(⇒) If ⟨N , F ,v⟩ is a ‘yes’-instance of Feat-Value-Opt, oN [F ] =
f = v . Hence, oN1 [F ] = oN2 [F ] = oN3 [F ] = oN4 [F ] = f , and f is
the unique average optimal value for F inM. This implies thatM
has a unique average optimal outcome which is rank optimal and
optimum, and thusM has a rank optimum outcome.
(⇐) If ⟨N , F ,v⟩ is a ‘no’-instance of Feat-Value-Opt, oN [F ] =
f , v . Hence, oN1 [F ] = oN2 [F ] = f and oN3 [F ] = oN4 [F ] = f , and
both f and f are average optimal values for F inM. This implies
thatM has two distinct average optimal outcomes, which are rank
optimal, and thusM has no rank optimum outcome. 
Exists-Rank-Optimum is in P [33], hence it is P-complete.
6 MAX VOTING
We now show the ΣP3 -completeness of deciding the existence of max
optimal outcomes inmCP-nets. To prove this we need an involved
reduction, for which we will give intuitions on the purpose of the
key pieces. The starting problem for the reduction is deciding the
validity of quantified Boolean formulas Φ = (∃X )(∀Y )(∃Z )ϕ(X ,Y ,
Z ), where X , Y , and Z , are three disjoint sets of Boolean variables,
and ϕ(X ,Y ,Z ) is a non-quantified Boolean formula. This problem
is ΣP3 -complete, and it is Σ
P
3 -hard even if ϕ is in 3CNF [49, 50].
In the reduction, we use as building pieces two CP-nets intro-
duced in [33]: An interconnecting net HC(m) “propagating the
information” that all them features of a set have been flipped to
their overlined value; and a net Fs(ϕ) encoding the satisfiability of a
3CNF non-quantified Boolean formula ϕ. The other building piece
that we need is the direct net introduced in Section 5. For notational
convenience, in this section we define direct nets as follows: the
direct net D(AB) is defined over feature setsA and B, for features
of A the non-overlined value is preferred, while for features of B
To transform the validity problem into Exists-Max-Optimal,
we need to encode Boolean assignments into outcomes of a suitable
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mCP-net. We use three sets of “variable features” X, Y, andZ, as-
sociated with the sets of Boolean variablesX , Y , and Z , respectively.
In particular, X = {XTi ,X Fi | xi ∈ X }, Y = {YTi ,Y Fi | yi ∈ Y },
and Z = {ZTi ,Z Fi | zi ∈ Z }. We use the following association
for the assignments. If we focus on the variables in X , for a (par-
tial) Boolean assignment σX over X , an outcome ασX encoding
σX over the features set X is such that if σX [xi ] = true then
ασX [XTi X Fi ] = xTi xFi , if σX [xi ] = false then ασX [XTi X Fi ] = xTi xFi ,
and if σX [xi ] is undefined then ασX [XTi X Fi ] = xTi xFi . (An outcome
ασX with ασX [XTi X Fi ] = xTi xFi will be dealt with so that it will
not give issues in the reduction.) We use a similar encoding for the
variable sets Y and Z over feature sets Y andZ, respectively.
The idea of the reduction is to design an mCP-net such that
specific outcomes encoding assignments for variables X are max
optimal iff the encoded assignments are witnesses of the validity
of the quantified formula. All other outcomes that are not in the
specific form encoding assignments forX have to bemax dominated
(and hence not max optimal). Besides the features associated with
the Boolean variables, there are various other features supporting
the correctness of the reduction. Two of these additional features are
U1 andU2, which are features belonging to the net Fs(ϕ) (see, [33]).
In particular, the principles of our reduction are:
(a) For an assignment σX on X , the associated outcome is βσX ,
where σX is encoded over the featuresX, βσX [U1U2] = u1u2,
and all other features have non-overlined values.
(b) Any outcome in a form different from the one described in
Principle (a) is max dominated.
(c) For a pair of assignments σX and σY on X and Y , respec-
tively, the associated outcome is βσX ,σY , where σX and
σY are encoded over the features X and Y, respectively,
βσX ,σY [U1U2] = u1u2, and all other features have non-over-
lined values.
(d) Any outcome in a form different from the one of Principle (c)
does not max dominate an outcome of Principle (a).
(e) If βσX and βσ ′X ,σY are two outcomes such that σX , σ ′X ,
then βσ ′X ,σY does not max dominate βσX . This imposes that
βσX might be max dominated only by an outcome encoding
the very same assignment for X of βσX .
(f ) If βσX and βσX ,σY are two outcomes, then βσX ,σY max dom-
inates βσX iff ϕ(X/σX ,Y/σY ,Z ) is not satisfiable.
A reduction following the principles above has the property that
only an outcome in the form βσX can be max optimal, and βσX is
max optimal iff σX is an assignment such that (∀Y )(∃Z )ϕ(X/σX ,Y ,
Z ) is valid, i.e., iff σX is a witness of the validity of the quantified
formula Φ. Therefore, anmCP-net obtained via this reduction has
a max optimal outcome iff the quantified formula is valid.
Let us now see the reduction. Let Φ = (∃X )(∀Y )(∃Z )ϕ(X ,Y ,Z )
be a quantified formula. From ϕ(X ,Y ,Z ) we define the 8CP-net
M(ϕ) = ⟨N1, . . . ,N8⟩ as follows.
The features ofM(ϕ) are:
• The features of a net Fs(ϕ) (see, [33]) in which we distinguish
three variable feature sets X = {XTi ,X Fi | xi ∈ X }, Y =
{YTi ,Y Fi | yi ∈ Y }, and Z = {ZTi ,Z Fi | zi ∈ Z } (P and D
are the literal and clause feature sets, respectively, A is the
set of features of the interconnecting net embedded in Fs(ϕ)
and A is the apex of the interconnecting net);
• Features Y ′ = {Y ′i | yi ∈ Y }, Y ′′ = {Y ′′i | yi ∈ Y };• Features in set B, which are the features Bi of an intercon-
necting net HC(|Y ′ |) and its apex is feature B (features Bi
and features Ai of the interconnecting net HC(m) embedded
in Fs(ϕ) are distinct).
To sum up,M(ϕ)’s features are X ∪Y ∪Y ′ ∪Y ′′ ∪Z ∪ P ∪D ∪
A ∪ B ∪ {U1,U2} (U1 andU2 are features of Fs(ϕ)).
The CP-nets ofM(ϕ) are (we do not report the direct nets in the
figures with the schematic representations of these CP-nets):
• N1 is composed by a net Fs(ϕ) (for a schematic representation
of this net see [33]), in which we distinguish three variable
feature sets X, Y, andZ, and a direct net D(Y ′Y ′′B).
This net supports Principle (f ). Indeed, we need a CP-net mimicking
a Boolean formula to encode the satisfiability of ϕ.
• N2 has, for each xi ∈ X , the link (XTi ,X Fi ), and a net D(Y
Y ′Y ′′ZPDAB{U1,U2}). The other CP tables are: for XTi ,
xTi ≻ xTi ; for X Fi , xFi ≻ xFi iff XTi has value xTi .
• N3 is similar to N2 with roles of XTi and X Fi exchanged.
The purpose of these two nets is achieved in conjunction with
nets N6 and N7 below. Their purpose is supporting Principle (e).
For nets N2 and N6, their preferences restricted over {XTi ,X Fi } are
xTi x
F
i ≺ xTi xFi ≺ xTi xFi ≺ xTi xFi ; while, for nets N3 and N7, their
preferences restricted over {XTi ,X Fi } are xTi xFi ≺ xTi xFi ≺ xTi xFi ≺
xTi x
F
i . Therefore, for an outcome βσX , if we focus on a pair of
features {XTi ,X Fi }, some of the nets prefer to change the values of
{XTi ,X Fi } in a specific way, and the other nets prefer something
different. Hence, intuitively, there will never be a group of agents
big enough such that βσX can be max dominated by an outcome
βσ ′X ,σY with σX , σ
′
X . Only outcomes βσ ′X ,σY with σX = σ
′
X
may max dominate βσX , because there will not be contrasting
preferences among the agents (this is Principle (e)).
• N4 (see Figure 1) has, for each yi ∈ Y , the links (U1,YTi ),
(U1,Y Fi ), (YTi ,Y ′i ), (Y Fi ,Y ′i ), (YTi ,Y ′′i ), (Y Fi ,Y ′′i ), (Y ′′i ,Y ′i ); the
links of a net HC(|Y ′ |) over features B and connected to fea-
tures Y ′, with apex B linked to U2; and the link (U1,U2).
There is the direct net D(XZPDA). The other CP tables
are: forU1, u1 ≻ u1; for F ∈ Y, f ≻ f iffU1 has value u1; for
Y ′′i ∈ Y ′′, y′′i ≻ y′′i iff XTi and X Fi have values yTi and yFi ;
for Y ′i ∈ Y ′, y′i ≻ y′i iff Y ′′i has value y′′i and either YTi or
Y Fi has an overlined value; features B of the interconnecting
net have the usual CP tables; for U2, u2 ≻ u2 iff U1 and B
have values u1 and b.
• N5 is similar to N4 with roles ofU1 andU2 exchanged.
These two nets are devised to achieve two “contrasting” goals. They
are designed so that for an outcome βσX , if we focus on a pair of
features {YTi ,Y Fi }, it is not possible to have improving flips toward
an outcome having overlined value for both YTi and Y
F
i (this is
required by Principle (d), because such an outcome would not
properly encode an assignment for variables Y ). On the other hand,
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Figure 1: A schematic representation for CP-net N4. The ex-
pression “(yTi ⊕ yFi )” in the CP table of Y ′i is satisfied when
exactly one feature amongYTi andY
F
i has an overlined value.
Figure 2: A schematic representation for CP-net N6.
these two nets allow improving flips toward outcomes properly
encoding an assignment σY for Y , and hence toward outcomes for
which either YTi or Y
F
i have an overlined value (this is required
by Principle (f )). Since these two nets have to exhibit this mixed
behavior, N4 and N5 have this slightly intricate structure.
• N6 (see Figure 2) has, for each xi ∈ X , the link (XTi ,X Fi ); for
each yi ∈ Y , the links (U1,YTi ), (U1,Y Fi ), (U2,YTi ), (U2,Y Fi );
and the link (U2,U1). There is the direct net D(Y ′Y ′′ZPD
AB). The other CP tables are: XTi and X Fi have CP tables as
in N2; forU2, u2 ≻ u2; forU1, u1 ≻ u1 iffU2 has value u2; for
F ∈ Y, f ≻ f iffU1 andU2 have values u1 and u2.
• N7 has, for each xi ∈ X , the link (X Fi ,XTi ); and the link(U2,U1). There is the direct net D(YY ′Y ′′ZPDAB). The
other CP tables are: XTi and X
F
i have CP tables as in N3; for
U2, u2 ≻ u2; forU1, u1 ≻ u1 iffU2 has value u2.
Figure 3: A schematic representation for CP-net N8.
• N8 (see Figure 3) has, for each yi ∈ Y , the links (U1,YTi ),
(U1,Y Fi ), (U2,YTi ), (U2,Y Fi ); and the link (U1,U2). There is
the direct net D(XY ′Y ′′ZPDAB). The other CP tables
are: for U1, u1 ≻ u1; for U2, u2 ≻ u2 iff U1 has value u1; for
F ∈ Y, f ≻ f iffU1 andU2 have values u1 and u2.
The aim of these nets is supporting the correctness of the reduction
and realizing all the principles listed above. This is achieved together
with various parts of the other nets.
M(ϕ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be com-
puted in polynomial time from Φ. Moreover, the class ofmCP-nets
derived from quantified formulas according to the reduction shown
above is polynomially connected. It is possible to prove the follow-
ing crucial property ofM(ϕ).
Lemma 6.1. Let Φ = (∃X )(∀Y )(∃Z )ϕ(X ,Y ,Z ) be a quantified for-
mula, where ϕ(X ,Y ,Z ) is a 3CNF formula defined over three disjoint
sets, X , Y , and Z , of variables. Then, Φ is valid iffM(ϕ) has a max
optimal outcome.
Lemma 6.1 implies the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. LetM be anmCP-net. Deciding whether there is
a max optimal outcome in M is ΣP3 -hard. Hardness holds even on
polynomially connected classes of acyclic and binarymCP-nets whose
indegree is three, and the number of agents is bounded to 8.
Exists-Max-Optimal is in ΣP3 [33], hence it is Σ
P
3 -complete.
Regarding the complexity of deciding the existence of max opti-
mum outcomes, we narrow down the upper-bound shown in the
literature. In fact, in order to decide whether anmCP-net has a max
optimum outcome, it is sufficient to guess an outcome α , and then
check, via an oracle call, that α is actually max optimum. The oracle
answering the latter question is in ΠP2 [33].
Theorem 6.3. LetM be anmCP-net. Deciding whether there is a
max optimum outcome inM is in ΣP3 .
7 RELATEDWORKS
The graphical structure of CP-nets evidences that, in general, pref-
erences may exhibit dependencies between features. Dependencies
certainly are a critical characteristic to model, however they can
become troublesome during preference aggregation. Whether de-
pendencies are actually problematic or not depends on the specific
ways in which agents’ votes are collected. Two ways of collecting
votes over combinatorial domains are the global voting and the
AAMAS’18, July 2018, Stockholm, Sweden Enrico Malizia
sequential voting [28]. In global voting, agents submit the entire
representation of their preferences, while, in sequential voting,
agents’ preferences are collected feature-by-feature. Global vot-
ing is the semantics of mCP-nets. Feature dependencies are not
an issue in global voting, because in this case all the information
needed for the aggregation is available. However, global voting can
be expensive to evaluate (especially if preferences are extensively
unfolded before any further processing). This computational bur-
den can be limited by adopting sequential voting, for which, on
the other hand, dependencies can be quite detrimental, to the point
that sub-optimal outcomes can be selected [28]. Lacy and Niou
[23] showed that these issues in sequential voting can be (partly)
avoided if the considered preferences are separable, i.e., they do not
have dependencies among features. Clearly, this is a very strong
assumption, and it is unlikely to be met in practice [26, 27, 52, 53].
To overcome this limitation, O-legality was proposed by Lang
[26] as a weaker restriction. Essentially, if O = (F1, . . . , Fm ) is
a sequence of features, a set P of agent preferences is O-legal
if, for any agent A ∈ P, and any two features Fi and Fj , i < j
implies that A’s preferences for Fi do not depends on Fj ’s value.
When preferences are represented via CP-nets, a set of CP-nets is
O-legal if O is a topological order shared among all the CP-nets’
graphs. Sequential voting over O-legal CP-nets has extensively
been investigated [26, 27, 52, 53], and O-legality of CP-nets has
been required in various other studies, e.g., [14, 18, 37, 38]. Of
these, an interesting approach to preference aggregation over O-
legal CP-nets was proposed in [14], where “probabilistic” CP-nets
were used to represent the result of the aggregation. However, also
O-legality is somewhat demanding [31, 46, 51], because it imposes
that there are no inversions in the preference dependencies.
For example, if in a set of CP-nets encoding preferences for a din-
ner there were an agent whose choice of the starter influences the
choice of the main dish and another agent whose choice of the main
dish influences the choice of the starter, then those CP-nets would
not be O-legal. To overcome this limitation, the hypercubewise
preference aggregation was introduced, however the semantics
of hypercubewise aggregation is different from global voting (see,
e.g., [12, 31, 32, 51]). Another approach is computing tailored voting
agendas to circumvent preference dependencies [1].
Although it was explicitly stated in the literature that a theoreti-
cal comparison between global and sequential voting was highly
promising [26], global voting over (non-O-legal) CP-nets has not
been thoroughly investigated as sequential voting.
The first work studying global voting over (not necessarily
O-legal) CP-nets was the one of Rossi et al. [43] in whichmCP-nets
are defined (remember thatmCP-nets’ semantics is global voting
over CP-nets). Most of the algorithms considered in [43] were brute-
force, hence, those algorithms gave only Exp upper bounds for most
of the global voting tasks over CP-nets, and no hardness result was
provided. Algorithms exploiting SAT solvers to compute global
Pareto optimal outcomes andweak Condorcet winners over CP-nets
were proposed in [29, 30]. Li et al. [31] extended those results to
computing weak Condorcet winners via SAT solvers even on cyclic
CP-nets, while Li et al. [32] introduced also the possibility of mul-
tivalued and incomplete CP-nets. Although the mentioned works
advanced the research on global voting over CP-nets, still they did
not provide precise complexity results. As mentioned above, the
complexity of these problems was reported as open several times in
the literature [26, 29–32], and only recently a work characterized
the exact complexity of some voting tasks overmCP-nets [33].
Regarding the P-completeness results, to the best of our knowl-
edge there is only another P-completeness result in the computa-
tional social choice literature [9, 11], and it is the complexity of
checking the essential set, which is a specific solution concept, over
weak tournaments. Weak tournaments are graphs representing
incomplete preference relations, and they directly encode a domi-
nance relation (after vote aggregation, we could say). Intuitively, the
data structure in input, i.e., the weak tournament, reports whether
an alternative is preferred to another via some voting procedure
(e.g., majority), but the preferences of the single agents are not
explicitly represented in the input. This means that the aggregation
of the preferences is assumed to be pre-computed and provided
in input. In this respect, our work is different because we assume
that the input contains the preferences of the single agents. More-
over, the papers cited above do not mention the consequences of
P-completeness in terms of non-parallelizability. In this respect, to
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first pointing to the
important issue of whether polynomial-time voting procedures can
scale up over big instances.
8 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have further analyzed the complexity ofmCP-nets,
whose dominance semantics is global voting over not necessarily
O-legal CP-nets. We have proven that deciding the existence of
max optimal and max optimum outcomes is ΣP3 -complete and in
ΣP3 , respectively. We have also shown that various polynomial-time
voting tasks over (m)CP-nets are actually P-complete, and hence
non-parallelizable. This points out a significant issue, which is
whether polynomial-time voting schemes are highly parallelizable,
so that parallel algorithms can scale up un big instances.
Possible directions for further research are showing the exact
complexity of deciding the existence of max optimum and Pareto
optimum outcomes inmCP-nets. AnalyzingmCP-nets when par-
tial CP-nets are allowed to be constituent of them will also be
important, given that the original definition ofmCP-nets used the
idea of partial CP-nets to model influences between preferences
of different agents. Having constraints on outcomes’s feasibility
is another interesting direction of investigation. Without any con-
straint, CP-nets model agents’ preferences when it is assumed that
all outcomes are attainable. However, this is not always the case.
During the aggregation precess, we have to take into account what
outcomes are feasible and what are not. For example, to decide
whether an outcome is majority dominated by another, we have
to check that the latter is actually feasible. A similar idea charac-
terized the solution concepts in NTU cooperative games defined
via constraints [19]. This approach could be integrated with the
definition of constrained CP-nets [5, 41], and a concept of compact
representation of constraints (see [20]) could also be introduced.
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